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Abstract (350 words) 
 
Recent work in developmental and comparative psychology suggests that humans are 
predisposed to align their mental states with those of conspecifics. One way this manifests is in 
cooperative communication; i.e., intentional communication aimed at coordinating the mental 
states of conspecifics with respect to events in a shared environment. This theory has received 
ample empirical support. However, two major limitations are: (1) the lack of a principled, formal 
account to facilitate computational modelling and derive predictions about empirical 
observations to guide experiments; and (2) the absence of specific predictions about relevant 
neural dynamics. This essay proposes an integrative approach to cooperative communication 
based on active inference, which suggests that action and perception operate synergistically to 
minimise uncertainty and optimise an individual’s internal model of the world. Here, we propose 
that humans are characterized by an evolved adaptive prior belief that their mental states are 
aligned with, or similar to, those of conspecifics; that is, that ‘we are the same sort of creature, 
inhabiting the same sort of niche.’ The usage of cooperative communication emerges as the 
principal means for gathering evidence for this belief, allowing the development of a shared 
narrative that disambiguates interactants’ hidden mental states. By enabling the alignment of 
prior beliefs between conspecifics, individuals attune to a (hermeneutic) niche comprising (in 
part) others’ mental states; and reciprocally, attune the niche to their own ends via epistemic 
niche construction. Specifically, niche construction enables features of the environment to 
encode precise, reliable cues about the deontic or shared value of certain action policies; e.g., the 
utility of using communicative constructions to disambiguate mental states, given shared prior 
beliefs. In turn, the alignment of mental states (prior beliefs) enables the emergence of a novel, 
Submitted manuscript (pre-peer-review, pre-copyedit). 
Frontiers in Psychology – Cultural Psychology. Special Issue: Imagining Culture Science: New Directions and 
Provocations. Please do not cite this version. 
 
 
 
contextualising scale of dynamics that encompasses the actions and mental states of the 
(ensemble of) interactants, along with non-social features of the shared niche. Via circular 
causality, this dynamics feeds back across scales to constrain the variability of the prior 
expectations of the individuals who constitute the contextualising layer of (cultural) organization. 
After reviewing supportive theoretical and empirical literature, we conclude by discussing future 
directions for research. 
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“If one reflects on the concrete activities that make up these abstractly named institutions – the 
economy, the polity, and the institutions for the reproduction of society (courtship, marriage, 
family, socialization, and education), the law, religion, and so forth, it turns out that interaction 
– and talk in interaction – figure centrally in them” (Schegloff, 2006,  p. 70). 
Introduction 
 
An influential body of recent work on human communication describes it as cooperative 
communication – intentional communication aimed at the alignment of mental states between 
conspecifics (reviewed in Tomasello, 2008, 2014, 2019). This is thought to be one particularly 
important behavioural manifestation of a broader, species-typical motivation to align mental 
states with those of others (Tomasello, Carpenter, Call, Behne, & Moll, 2005). Some have 
hypothesised that this motivation is the result of selective pressures acting on human evolution in 
the context of collaborative foraging (Tomasello, Melis, Tennie, Wyman, & Herrmann, 2012; 
Whiten & Erdal, 2012). In scenarios where individuals in a group must forage together for 
resources (food, water, information, etc.), the alignment of multiple individuals’ goals, 
intentions, and attentional processes is necessary for success (e.g., Liebenberg, 2006). This view 
has been useful for empirical investigation in developmental and comparative psychology 
(reviewed in Call, 2009; Carpenter & Liebal, 2011; MacLean, 2016). 
So far, however, this general theoretical stance has lacked a formal grounding. This is 
important because formal accounts may be useful for assessing the utility of theoretical proposals 
when investigating the processes that underwrite human communication. For instance, making 
explicit a theory’s predictions is useful for computational modelling of the phenomena to which 
the theory pertains, e.g., the acquisition of a communicative system in ontogenesis (McCauley & 
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Christiansen, 2014) and its development across historical timespans (Christiansen & Kirby, 
2003). This paper attempts to address this concern by leveraging a recent active inference 
formulation that has been proposed in theoretical neuroscience (and biology) to specify the 
dynamics of belief-guided, embodied action (Friston, 2012, 2013). In doing so, we use an 
approach that – in addition to providing a potentially useful formal framework (see below) – 
provides highly pointed neurobiological predictions (Friston, 2010; e.g., Adams, Shipp, & 
Friston, 2013; Bastos et al., 2012; Parr & Friston, 2017, 2018). This is important, as such 
predictions are largely absent from the body of existing work introduced above (however, see, 
e.g., Hare & Tomasello, 2005). 
In brief, active inference is a mathematical formulation of the tendency of living systems 
to maintain themselves in a restricted set of states (their phenotypic states), while embedded in a 
fluctuating, partially known environment (Friston, 2012, 2013). More precisely, active inference 
formalises the structure of exchanges between organisms (individuals and groups) and their 
environment – it is a theory that explains how organisms and their ecological niches become 
attuned to each other, that is, the manner in which the structure and dynamics of organisms and 
their environment become similar to, or predictive of, one another via action-perception cycles; 
in the sense of coming to embody the same statistical structure (Bruineberg, Kiverstein, & 
Rietveld, 2018). In short, active inference suggests that every organism optimises its internal 
model of the world via action-perception cycles that minimise an upper bound on biophysical 
surprise (i.e., variational free-energy); and that, in turn, the environment becomes attuned to the 
organisms that inhabit it. We will see later that this is formally equivalent to maximising the 
evidence for internal or generative models of the felt world – and that when the world (e.g., the 
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cultural niche) is shared, then the generative models of its denizens become committed to a 
shared narrative. 
The aim of this paper is to leverage these recent extensions of the active inference 
formulation to provide an account of the phenomena circumscribing cooperative communication. 
Active inference affords a broadly generalisable theory of biophysical dynamics that can be 
extended to any species (Badcock, Friston, & Ramstead, 2019; Ramstead, Badcock, & Friston, 
2018). Following a recent hypothesis of the embodied human brain derived from active 
inference, called the hierarchically mechanistic mind (Badcock, Friston, & Ramstead, 2019; 
Badcock, Friston, Ramstead, Ploeger, & Hohwy, 2019), we develop an approach to cooperative 
communication that combines active inference with substantive research in psychology and 
allied disciplines that catches the specific evolutionary, developmental, and real-time dynamics 
that produce human phenotypes. We base our account on extensions of active inference to model 
the dynamics of human cultural systems (Constant, Ramstead, Veissière, & Friston, 2019; 
Veissière, Constant, Ramstead, Friston, & Kirmayer, 2019) and evolution by natural selection 
(Badcock, 2012; Badcock, Friston, & Ramstead, 2019; Campbell, 2016). 
Of particular relevance here, a key corollary of this approach is the construct of an 
adaptive prior (see Badcock, Friston, Ramstead, et al., 2019). Adaptive priors are evolutionarily 
endowed, species-typical beliefs that guide characteristic patterns of cognition and behaviour in 
conspecifics. In other words, adaptive priors are action-guiding beliefs1 that have been shaped by 
selection to motivate action-perception cycles toward adaptive, unsurprising outcomes (Badcock, 
Friston, & Ramstead, 2019; Badcock, Friston, Ramstead, et al., 2019; Ramstead et al., 2018). 
                                               
1 In this setting, ‘beliefs’ refer to (subpersonal) Bayesian beliefs – in the sense of Bayesian belief 
updating or belief propagation (as opposed to propositional beliefs). 
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Such priors may be underwritten by genetic, epigenetic, and/or cultural inheritance, and manifest 
in flexible neurocognitive dynamics that allow for sensitive adaptation to the local environment 
(Badcock, Friston, Ramstead, et al., 2019). Adaptive priors effectively constrain the space of 
prior beliefs learned during ontogeny to enable adaptive action in local cultural niches (Badcock, 
Friston, & Ramstead, 2019; Ramstead, Constant, Veissière, & Friston, 2019). 
Our proposal is as follows. We suggest that natural selection has endowed humans with 
an adaptive prior for alignment; i.e., an adaptive prior preference for action policies that generate 
sensory evidence that reliably indicates that their own mental states are aligned with, or similar 
to, those of conspecifics. This adaptive prior fosters intentional, patterned action sequences that 
gather evidence (i.e., sensory observations) for this belief; that is, that gather evidence for the 
hypothesis that ‘we are the same kind of creature, inhabiting the same kind of niche.’ The 
adaptive prior here functions to bias action and inference by leading agents to actively sample 
their sensorium in a way that, on average and over time, disambiguates conspecifics’ (hidden) 
mental states. This sampling process is therefore guided by, and generates evidence for, the 
belief that our mental states are aligned. In short, we cast cooperative communication as an 
evidence gathering process; indeed, one that extends across temporally nested scales of analysis. 
The existence of this process follows from, and only from, an adaptive prior specifying the 
alignment of individuals’ mental states2. Cooperative communication can thus be cast as a 
fulfilling prophecy, driven by the belief that we are alike. This belief is then characteristically 
reinforced by the evidence generated by belief-guided communication. 
                                               
2 On a deflationary view, this is the only solution that can exist, in terms of minimising the 
surprise or free energy of coupled free energy minimising agents. See below and Friston, Levin, 
Sengupta, & Pezzulo (2015) for a fuller discussion in the context of pattern formation. 
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The structure of the remainder of the paper is as follows. In the second section, we review 
key phenomena that underwrite cooperative communication. In the third section, we introduce 
relevant aspects of active inference, illustrated by examples drawn from studies of cooperative 
communication. In the fourth section, we leverage this background to argue that human species-
typical adaptive priors prescribe the alignment of one’s mental states with those of conspecifics. 
This latter argument is presented in three subsections; the first one focuses on real-time dynamics 
(i.e., interaction) from the perspectives of an individual and dyad, respectively; the second 
focuses on ontogeny; and the third focuses on the timescale of cultural evolution. The paper 
concludes by suggesting avenues for future work. 
 
Theoretical Background 
 
The evolutionary origins of cooperative communication 
 
 Evolutionarily selected ‘mutual expectations of cooperativeness’ are thought to motivate 
the usage of cooperative communication (Tomasello, 2014). From the perspective of 
evolutionary biology, these expectations can be explained by considering the selective contexts 
that favoured them. One promising candidate is so-called obligate collaborative foraging 
(Tomasello et al., 2012), where adaptive success in securing food and other resources is marked 
by a necessary dependence on cooperation with others (also, Baumard, André, & Sperber, 2013). 
For instance, in mutualistic ‘stag hunt’ games, a single individual is necessary to obtain a low 
risk, but low reward, food item (a hare), but two individuals are necessary to obtain a high risk, 
but high reward, food item (a stag). Here, collaboration appears as the riskier, but more 
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rewarding, option3. It is riskier because, to cooperate effectively, the would-be partners must 
somehow align their mental states – their goals, intentions, and attention (Skyrms, 2001). Such 
joint foraging scenarios may point towards an important and recurrent aspect of the early 
selective pressures that favoured the motivations and skills underlying cooperative 
communication (McLoone & Smead, 2014). Indeed, in high risk stag hunt scenarios children 
communicated more, and more often, relative to low risk situations (Duguid, Wyman, Bullinger, 
Herfurth-Majstorovic, & Tomasello, 2014). 
Research examining the communicative behaviour of extant non-human primates is 
crucial for understanding the evolutionarily nascent form of modern humans’ communicative 
motivations and skills (Call & Tomasello, 2007; for relevant discussion, see White, Lovejoy, 
Asfaw, Carlson, & Suwa, 2015). Such work suggests that, generally speaking, the motivation 
and skills of non-human primates for intentional communication may have been gradually 
‘cooperativized’ across human evolution (Tomasello, 2014); that is, exapted for both cooperative 
and competitive purposes with conspecifics. This trajectory may have begun with the usage of 
gestural communication geared towards simply eliciting specific responses from certain 
individuals (Call & Tomasello, 2007). For instance, something like ritualized great ape ‘attention 
grabbers’ – where an individual has learned that (for a certain conspecific) an action like 
slapping the ground loudly will likely bring about a desired state of the world (e.g., the initiation 
of play; Tomasello, 2008) – may have been the evolutionary precursor to certain manifestations 
of cooperative communication, like declarative pointing (Tomasello, 2019). Indeed, the 
motivational component is key (Rekers, Haun, & Tomasello, 2011): human-raised non-human 
                                               
3 In the active inference formulation, below, collaboration is ‘rewarding’ in the sense of 
maximising a shared or prosocial utility (Devaine et al., 2014; Yoshida et al., 2008). 
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great apes will occasionally point for humans (though never for conspecifics). However, they 
only do this ‘selfishly,’ that is, only when they expect the gesture to cause the individual to (say) 
get an out-of-reach object for the ape (Bullinger, Zimmermann, Kaminski, & Tomasello, 2011). 
In contrast, with cooperative communication, the underlying motive is argued to be 
‘fundamentally’ cooperative (Tomasello, 2019); that is, from the onset of cooperative 
communication in ontogeny, human infants only appear satisfied following a communicative bid 
when their communicative partner has aligned their mental states with their own, with respect to 
the infant’s intended referent (reviewed in Carpenter & Liebal, 2011; for comparative 
considerations, see Carpenter & Call, 2013). 
 
The developmental origins of cooperative communication 
 
Young human infants, from nine to twelve months of age and across cultures, begin to 
leverage cooperative communication to align and coordinate mental states (Carpenter, Nagell, & 
Tomasello, 1998; Lieven & Stoll, 2013). One way this manifests initially is in declarative 
pointing gestures directed towards referents in the immediate environment (Tomasello, 
Carpenter, & Liszkowski, 2007). Experimental work suggests that the goal of infants’ 
communication in such cases is to mutually align emotions, attitudes, and/or thoughts about a 
referent with another individual (e.g., Liszkowski, Carpenter, & Tomasello, 2007; Liszkowski, 
Schäfer, Carpenter, & Tomasello, 2009). That is, part of the state of the world that motivates 
infants’ earliest communication – that is, the goals of their intentional communication – pertains, 
in part, to (alignment with) other agents’ mental states (Tomasello et al., 2007). An inability to 
obtain such goals – for instance, experiencing repeated exposure to dis-aligned mental states, 
despite communicative efforts to align mental states – should thus result in negative affect. 
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Indeed, (Liszkowski et al., 2004) found that infants became unsatisfied with uncooperative 
adults, that is, those who ignored infants’ communicative bids, who did not provide an emotional 
response symmetrical to the infant’s, and who did not shift the focus of their attention back and 
forth between the infant and their referent. 
This example illustrates a key feature of cooperative communication, namely, joint 
attention to a referent (Clark, 1996; Tomasello, 2008). There is substantial inconsistency in 
definitions of joint attention within and across psychological subdisciplines (Wolf, in 
preparation). We follow the lead of Tomasello and colleagues (e.g., Tomasello, 1995) by 
defining joint attentional situations (i.e., joint attention) as triadic situations in which two or 
more individuals possess reliable evidence that all participants are attending to the same referent, 
and that all participants know they are attending to the same referent (i.e., ‘attending together’). 
This formulation of joint attention – in terms of reliable evidence for the mutually inferred 
alignment of attention (cf. mental states) – fits well with our proposal, which mandates the 
gathering of reliable evidence for the alignment of mental states. 
The importance of joint attention for enabling cooperative communication comes from 
the fact that joint attention enables – and is, in part, enabled by – individuals’ capacity to reliably 
‘ground’ their communication in shared referents (Clark, 1996). Grounding creates something 
called common ground (Clark & Brennan, 1991). Common ground is the set of mental states 
(knowledge, beliefs, emotions, etc.) that is shared with others (Clark, 1996; Gadamer, 2003; 
Tomasello, 2014). The capacity to regulate communication by leveraging common ground – 
implying a capacity for joint attention – is present from the onset of cooperative communication 
(Tomasello et al., 2007). For instance, 12- and 18-month-old infants use their shared experience 
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playing with an adult to disambiguate the adult’s subsequent (ambiguous) communication 
(Tomasello & Haberl, 2003). 
Moreover, part of regulating communication with respect to common ground is 
understanding, for instance, that one must try to ‘fit’ their communication to the inferred needs 
of another (Clark & Wilkes-Gibbs, 1986). As a simple example of this kind of ‘perspectivizing’ 
(Verhagen, 2007) or ‘recipient design’ (Schegloff, 2006) process, consider that how one chooses 
to talk about an artefact varies as a function of the inferred amount of cultural common ground 
shared with one’s interlocutor. In the presence of much cultural common ground, a 
communicator might opt for brevity; and conversely, in the presence of less cultural common 
ground, one might use more precise (explicit, descriptive) language. For instance, when 
conversing with someone from Western cultural groups, one might employ the more 
cumbersome, longer descriptive utterance “the terrifying creature from Turkish folklore that 
appears during sleep paralysis” instead of the shorter proper name “Karabasan” (Jalal et al., in 
press). The upshot is that, in general, more common ground means less communication is needed 
to align mental states to a sufficient degree, and less common ground means more 
communication is required (Tomasello, 2008). In other words, the amount of information 
necessary to align mental states to a degree adequate to enable cooperative behaviour within a 
given context is inversely proportional to the amount of common ground. 
 This turns on an important point: the optimization of relevance in cooperative 
communication (Sperber & Wilson, 1986). Relevance refers to the complexity-accuracy trade-off 
(e.g., the trade-off between simplicity or compressibility, and meaningfulness or expressivity) 
involved in the production and interpretation of communication. A useful way to think about this 
trade-off is in terms of communicative constructions. Communicative constructions are patterned 
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pairings of form and meaning (e.g., word parts and order, intonation) whose synchronic use is 
the result of diachronic patterns of use and associated intergenerational transmission (e.g., 
processes of grammaticalization and reanalysis; Bybee, 2010; Goldberg, 2003). Cooperative 
communicators use communicative constructions to communicate (and thereby align their mental 
states; Tomasello, 2008). 
Optimizing relevance, for a speaker, therefore means using the most minimal form that is 
expected to enable a listener to recover (something sufficiently similar to) the intended meaning 
(e.g., Kanwal, Smith, Culbertson, & Kirby, 2017); and for a listener, it means inferring the most 
parsimonious meaning that sufficiently explains the speaker’s intentions (e.g., Kao, Wu, Bergen, 
& Goodman, 2014; see Goodman & Frank, 2016). This means, as above, that individuals sharing 
more common ground require less form to adequately align mental states, while those sharing 
less common ground require relatively more form (Winters, Kirby, & Smith, 2018). Relatedly, 
simpler propositions generally require less form to convey, and more complex propositions 
require more form (Kemmer, 2003). Producing and interpreting relevant communicative 
constructions thus has implications across the communicative signal, which spans from (e.g.) 
lexical selection and word order choice to the sequencing of particular phonemes and intonation 
patterns (Aylett & Turk, 2004). 
How might an individual recognize another’s intention to generate acts of communication 
intended ‘for’ oneself in the first place (e.g., Behne, Carpenter, & Tomasello, 2005)? From 
another perspective, how might one make mutually apparent one’s proximate motivation to align 
mental states, that is, that one is communicating ‘for’ another individual? To this end, 
researchers have proposed that ostensive cues (Sperber & Wilson, 1986), like eye contact, 
spatiotemporal contingency, and the communicative (e.g., vocal) signal itself play a useful role 
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in making mutually apparent an agent’s intentions to communicate information intended to align 
mental states (reviewed in Csibra, 2010). Ostensive cues work by ‘grabbing’ the attention of 
others so as to redirect it ‘triadically’ (Szufnarowska, Rohlfing, Fawcett, & Gredebäck, 2014); 
that is, towards the producer and their intended referent (so as to, e.g., comment on the referent). 
This is important, as joint attention plays a central mechanistic role in aligning mental states 
(Tomasello, 2019; indeed, Tomasello, 2014, synonymously refers to cooperative communication 
as ‘ostensive-inferential’ communication). Thus, via their modulatory effects on the joint 
allocation of attention, ostensive cues play a critical, if indirect, role in increasing the inferred 
reliability of one’s inferences about the relationship between both individuals’ mental states 
(e.g., Moll, Carpenter, & Tomasello, 2007). This has important effects on individuals’ 
subsequent behaviour. For example, communicative eye contact is sufficient for pre-schoolers to 
quickly infer another’s desire to collaboratively play a stag hunt game (Siposova, Tomasello, & 
Carpenter, 2018; Wyman, Rakoczy, & Tomasello, 2013). More broadly, through its effects on 
redirecting attention, ostension may play an important role in guiding inductive inference and 
top-down categorization processes across ontogenesis (Butler & Tomasello, 2016; Kovács, 
Téglás, Gergely, & Csibra, 2017). 
 
Taking stock 
 
In sum, five key components characterizing cooperative communication were distilled in 
this section. Discussion of these components structures much of Section 4. First, non-human 
great apes do not characteristically employ communication geared towards aligning mental states 
with conspecifics. Moreover, something like the motivations and skills underlying the 
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communication of non-human great apes likely served as a precursor to the evolution of 
cooperative communication in humans. Second, human communication is fuelled by a 
motivation to align and coordinate mental states with conspecifics. This is a kind of mutual 
expectation of cooperativeness that is manifest most basically in processes of joint attention, and 
which serves as a kind of ‘evolutionarily endowed’ common ground that gets the process of 
communication ‘off the ground’ in human ontogenesis. Third, individuals using cooperative 
communication optimize the relevance of their communication, that is, the produced and inferred 
expressiveness of the communicative signal with respect to the production and processing costs 
of that signal. This turns on the common ground shared by interlocutors, such that, all else equal, 
more common ground means less communication and less common ground means more 
communication. Fourth, ostensive cues signal one’s intention to communicate to another 
individual (and help one to disambiguate another’s intention to communicative to oneself). These 
are cues like eye contact, contingency, and the speech signal itself. 
Fifth and finally, it is useful to highlight that cooperative communication typically 
manifests (particularly in early ontogeny) as a circular or bidirectional flow of information (note, 
e.g., the double-arrowed base of the canonical ‘joint attentional triangle,’ Carpenter & Liebal, 
2011). Thus, although we introduced cooperative communication by focusing largely on 
individual imperatives, it is a fundamentally collaborative process (see Clark & Wilkes-Gibbs, 
1986), that is, one of a relevance-optimized mutual exchange of perspectives that manifests as a 
process of ‘least collaborative effort’ (Clark & Brennan, 1991). This characteristic circularity 
endows individuals with a single shared narrative constituted by their individual perspectives and 
roles in the collaborative context (Tomasello, 2014). We summarize these points (and some 
considered in Section 4) in Figure 1. 
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Implicit in the preceding discussion is the idea that it would be surprising – that is, highly 
atypical – to find an adult human without a communicative system that they could employ to 
align their mental states with those of others. In this sense, the usage of cooperative 
communicative is a predictable, or expected, aspect characterising part of the human phenotype. 
A question one might ask is, How does this expectation over species-typical states (i.e., this 
aspect of the phenotype) persist, robustly, across time and (action in) a fluctuating niche? 
 
Active Inference 
 
Active inference is a theory of belief-guided adaptive action (Friston, FitzGerald, Rigoli, 
Schwartenbeck, & Pezzulo, 2017). It is a mathematical framework that models the processes by 
which organisms and their niche come to ‘fit’ or become ‘attuned’ to each other; that is, the 
manner in which organisms and their environments come to possess statistical properties that are 
predictable from each other (Bruineberg, Rietveld, Parr, van Maanen, & Friston, 2018; Constant, 
Ramstead, Veissière, Campbell, & Friston, 2018). On this view, organisms come to embody 
statistical models of their ecological niche via perception and learning, and natural selection (i.e., 
empirical and adaptive priors, respectively); and they come to modify their niche to fit their prior 
beliefs via adaptive action and niche construction. The models in this formulation are ‘generative 
models’ that recapitulate the causal (in)dependences between the factors that generate their 
sensory input (i.e., how the niche causes their sensory data; e.g., Hinton, 2007; LeCun, Bengio, 
& Hinton, 2015). In active inference, organisms are (roughly speaking) normative models of 
what ought to be the case, given ‘the kind of creature that I am’ (Friston, 2011). 
The main theoretical suggestion of this paper is that human individuals appear, 
characteristically (i.e., species-typically), to be endowed with an adaptive prior that one’s mental 
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states are aligned with those of conspecifics. Now, for human agents, the mental states of other 
agents are unobservable (or ‘hidden’) states, which need to be inferred on the basis of perceptual 
cues (e.g., gaze direction, posture, facial expression). This is just to make anew the 
(uncontroversial) point that mental state alignment is an inference problem: to align with others, 
an agent must infer the latent or hidden causes of observable consequences; i.e., their own mental 
states and those of others. Mental states, in virtue of acting on the world, cause sensory 
outcomes; that is, the sensory consequences actions. Thus, on the present account, the set of 
actions that resolve uncertainty about the niche (constituted, in part, by others’ mental states) 
must comprise actions that disambiguate others’ mental states4. We suggest that this situation 
fosters specific (patterned) forms of communicative action and attentional orienting that are 
aimed at inferring the mental states of other agents. The characteristic result of this process is the 
alignment of mental states between conspecifics; that is, the development of a kind of shared 
narrative about our jointly experienced sensations (Friston & Frith, 2015a). 
 
Active inference, adaptive priors, and alignment 
 
In active inference, actions are generated by hierarchically organized policies (beliefs 
about action). The policy pursued by an organism at a particular time is the one that minimises 
variational free energy (Friston et al., 2015). Free energy, roughly speaking, quantifies the 
                                               
4 This is described as anthropomorphically, as though individuals are explicitly engaged in an 
inference like ‘I want to attune the statistics of our brains.’ Clearly, this is not the case. Rather, 
this language is used for expository purposes. Indeed, this descriptive tendency is essentially the 
same as that used by, e.g., Tomasello (2019), where talk of humans’ ultimate motivation to align 
and coordinate mental states often surfaces in place of proximate instantiations thereof. We thank 
L. Li (personal communication, December, 2018) for noting this ambiguity. 
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discrepancy between what an agent expects or prefers to sense and what it actually senses. This 
conception of free energy is closely related to prediction error; namely, the mismatch between 
predicted and observed sensations. A complementary view of free energy is that it scores the 
(negative log) evidence for the model generating predictions; in the sense that sensory data that 
conform to predictions provide evidence for the veracity of the generative model. In short, 
minimising free energy is the same as soliciting sensory evidence for one’s model of the world – 
sometimes known as self-evidencing (Hohwy, 2016). 
The free energy expected under a policy tracks the probability of that particular policy 
being pursued (i.e., of that specific policy being selected to guide action), with less expected free 
energy indicating a more probable policy (Friston et al., 2015; Pezzulo, Rigoli, & Friston, 2018; 
relatedly, Cisek, 2007). Expected free energy can be decomposed into two terms: pragmatic 
value (the expected log evidence of some outcome, given a generative model of how outcomes 
depend on action) and epistemic value (the information gain of an observation). The relative 
influence of each term quantifies the degree to which a particular policy generates actions that 
explore the niche (i.e., exploration) or actions that leverage reliable expectations about the niche 
to secure preferred outcomes5 (i.e., exploitation) (Friston et al., 2015). This is depicted in Figure 
26. 
                                               
5 These outcomes are a priori preferred because they are the least surprising ones; i.e., outcomes 
that ‘a creature like me’ would expect to encounter. 
6 A mathematically equivalent but complementary division of expected free energy is into 
ambiguity and risk. Ambiguity is the expected uncertainty about outcomes given some state in 
the future, while risk is the divergence between anticipated and preferred outcomes. 
Interestingly, risk is also the expected complexity cost found in statistics. This means that 
minimising expected free energy – by selecting the right kind of policies – implicitly minimises 
the complexity cost of inference. This is exactly the imperative established in the previous 
section; namely to find ‘common ground’ that minimises communication cost. This particular 
perspective can be traced back to the foundational principles of universal computation, where 
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Regarding epistemic value, salient policies are those that gather information about the 
niche (Parr & Friston, 2017). This, in turn, enables pragmatic imperatives to foster actions that 
capitalize on learned regularities (Friston et al., 2015). For example, infants’ attentional orienting 
appears to optimise information gain when in the presence of native speakers of their first 
language and speakers of a foreign language (Begus, Gliga, & Southgate, 2016). Over repeated 
exposures, this may lead infants to prefer gathering information from speakers of their native 
language relative to speakers of a foreign language (Marno et al., 2016); individuals exploit their 
knowledge of communicative constructions to disambiguate the mental states of others (i.e., to 
learn about the niche). This is elaborated below. 
In active inference, the folk-psychological term ‘attention’ refers to two distinct, but 
closely related, phenomena; namely, epistemic value and precision weighting (Parr & Friston, 
2017). Epistemic value, salience, or affordance is the component of policy selection just 
discussed; it is that component of the value of policies that tracks how much a policy reduces 
uncertainty about the state of the world (e.g., Friston, Adams, Perrinet, & Breakspear, 2012). It 
provides a description of the folk-psychological phenomenon of activity orienting towards or 
‘turning one’s attention’ to a certain modality or part of the sensory field (e.g., in visual saccades 
that sample a particular location in visual space). In short, salience or epistemic affordance is an 
attribute of how we sample the world – in the sense that actively sampling sensory information 
will reduce uncertainty, in relation to our current beliefs. In contrast, precision is an attribute of 
the sensory data per se. Imprecise sensory data should have less effect on (Bayesian) belief 
                                               
variational free energy is often discussed in terms of minimum description or message lengths. 
See MacKay (1995), Schmidhuber (2010), and Wallace & Dowe (1999) more discussion. 
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updating, relative to precise information. It is therefore important to afford the right precision to 
each sensory sample, via precision weighting. 
 Precision-weighing is the related (but distinct) attentional process that determines the 
relative influence of bottom-up error signals and top-down expectations in the brain; e.g., a high 
precision on sensory signals corresponds to low confidence in top-down beliefs (A. Clark, 2013; 
Powers, Kelley, & Corlett, 2016). That is, in the sense of precision-weighting, ‘attention’ refers 
to the optimization of the precision (inverse variance) of prior beliefs about the causes of sensory 
data, relative to the precision of those data; in other words, attentional selection is in the game of 
selecting the right sort of sensory information for belief updating. This precision weighting in the 
brain is thought to be mediated by the modulation of neuronal gain (Kanai, Komura, Shipp, & 
Friston, 2015). Precise (attended, ascending) error signals then serve to modulate action and 
direct what is learned (Adams et al., 2013; Feldman & Friston, 2010). The complement of this 
attentional selection is the attenuation of precision; known in psychophysics as sensory 
attenuation; i.e., attending away from or ignoring certain sensations; particularly those we cause 
ourselves.  
Crucially, selective attention and attenuation of precision can be part of the covert 
(mental) actions that are entailed by a policy. In other words, when selecting the policy that 
minimises expected free energy we are also committing to both overt action on the (embodied) 
world – through moving, blushing, speaking etc. – and a covert attentional set. We will now 
illustrate these aspects (orienting to salient stimuli and attentional selection) of active inference 
with two examples. 
As a first example, in the case of human communication, orienting to salient sensory 
streams should enhance the ability to learn the causes (i.e., mental states) generating sensory 
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evidence by making beliefs about mental states generating that stream more probable. With this 
in mind, note that one common motivation for infants’ and young children’s communication is 
quintessentially uncertainty resolving and ‘interrogative’ (Begus & Southgate, 2012; Harris, 
Bartz, & Rowe, 2017). For instance, infants’ pointing can function as a request for information 
about the name or function of objects (Begus & Southgate, 2012; Kovács, Tauzin, Téglás, 
Gergely, & Csibra, 2014). It is thus interesting that, in line with the present account, orienting to 
communicative bids enhances learning of (e.g.) communicative constructions and object 
functions (Begus, Gliga, & Southgate, 2014; Lucca & Wilbourn, 2018a, 2018b; see Friston, & 
Frith, 2015a). In short, infants evince sophisticated policies for resolving uncertainty and 
creating opportunities for epistemic foraging. In turn, attending to and learning the causes of the 
communicative stream then enables policies to exploit prior beliefs about how such sensations 
were caused; that is, inferring whether or not we are aligned, based on the evidence generated 
through our interactions (e.g., in using learned constructions to ask, explicitly, ‘Do you 
understand?’). This brings us to our second example. 
For agents who expect their predictions to be fulfilled, individuals who do not provide 
evidence for this expectation – despite one’s attempts to actively attune mental states – should 
come to be treated as imprecise sources of sensory information, relative to others that fulfil their 
expected ‘role’ in the evidence gathering process; i.e., others that are afforded epistemic trust 
(Fonagy and Allison, 2014). In other words, in a given communicative interaction, salient 
policies are those that are expected to be useful with respect to the alignment of mental states; 
e.g., in certain instances of conversational repair (Schegloff, Jefferson, & Sacks, 1977). Across 
interactions with specific others, repeatedly experiencing surprising responses (i.e., insufficient 
evidence for, or evidence against, alignment) means that selective attention towards those 
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specific others comes to be afforded low precision (i.e., ignored). Subsequently, action should 
lead the appearance, on average across time, of avoidance such unreliable parts of the niche 
(Constant et al., 2018) – much as we tend to avoid the dark when searching for something 
(Demirdjian et al., 2005). 
We suggest that this provides an explanation of the findings by Liszkowski et al. (2004), 
discussed above, which reported that 12-month-olds were dissatisfied with an uncooperative 
adult who failed to provide both look-backs between the infant and their intended referent and 
the same emotional response as the infant in response to the infant’s communicative bids. On our 
view, infants were attempting a kind of fast ‘error correction’ by generating actions expected to 
minimize exposure to unexpected cues (i.e., allostatic control; see Pezzulo, Rigoli, & Friston, 
2015). This occurred via a rapid increase in the salience of policies that generate pointing 
behaviour when sampling sensory data that was inconsistent with infants’ prior beliefs about 
alignment. Moreover, only the group of infants who attempted to communicate with an 
uncooperative adult pointed significantly less across trials; through the lens of active inference, 
they had revised their expectations about the sensory effects of action, leading them to select 
other policies. 
This second example suggests that, within and across trials of the experiment, infants 
appeared to climb an evidence gradient for their expectations. That is, repeated orienting to cues 
indicative of the (dis)alignment of prior beliefs – despite allostatic control geared towards 
avoiding such surprising encounters – caused infants to infer and learn that their interaction 
partner was unhelpful with regards to gathering evidence for their (species-typical) prior beliefs. 
For the infant, orienting to the sensory consequences of repeated failed attempts to elicit 
evidence from the adult indicative of alignment (e.g., look-backs and symmetrical emotions) had 
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an impact on the expected free energy of policies. In particular, policies geared towards inferring 
the prior beliefs of the uncooperative adult came to be characterized by a relatively high 
expected free energy. Consequently, such policies became relatively unlikely to gain control over 
action; i.e., less communication with that adult. 
In sum, by suggesting that humans are characterized by an adaptive prior for alignment, 
we effectively argue that policies expected to disambiguate others’ mental states are 
characterized in humans by a low expected free energy in virtue of their epistemic affordance 
(i.e., such policies tend to dominate action). Repeatedly leveraging this belief to guide context-
sensitive patterns of action, in turn, enables agents to learn the structure and dynamics of the 
niche. Crucially, for humans the niche includes others’ mental states, and hence entails beliefs 
about how to act to effectively infer and align with them. For us, this means that learning entails 
refining one’s set of ‘communicative policies’ to approximate the set of policies expected (i.e., 
used) in one’s cultural milieu. In short, leveraging communicative constructions means 
converging on the mutually inferred, or deontic, value of policies geared towards disambiguating 
mental states, to which we now turn. 
 
Deontic value: Shared expectations about the value of policies 
 
Above we assumed that the prior beliefs of conspecifics had converged on the set of 
constructions leveraged in their cultural niche. This assumption is important, as our argument 
considers the acquisition and (cultural) evolution of communicative constructions (Sections 4.2 
and 4.3). Within active inference, the concept of shared or deontic value – and associated deontic 
cues – (Constant et al., 2018, 2019) may be useful for understanding the emergence of 
cooperative communication in ontogeny and cultural evolution. 
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 The deontic value of a policy rests on a direct (‘automatized’) likelihood mapping 
between learned cues and associated action policies. The mapping from deontic cue to policy is 
‘direct’ in the sense that observation of a deontic cue comes to ‘automatically’ elicit an 
associated (i.e., learned) policy7. Deontic cues are observations that trigger such automatic, or 
habitual, policy selection (Constant et al., 2019). Encultured agents learn deontic observation-
policy mappings in development, through their engagement with the deontic cues that populate 
their local cultural niche (e.g., Chukoskie, Snider, Mozer, Krauzlis, & Sejnowski, 2013). By 
‘offloading’ cognition into the environment in this way (see Clark, 2008; and Clark, 2006), the 
direct mapping enables individuals to bypass costly updates to, and metabolic upkeep of, their 
beliefs about what to do (given what is inferred of the niche). This allows agents to rely directly 
on deontic cues to select the most appropriate policy (Constant et al., 2018). There is clearly a 
close relationship between deontic cues, semiotics, and signs (Goodwin, 2000; Sewell, 1992; 
Silverstein, 2003) that underwrite communication. Perhaps the most celebrated system of 
encultured deontic cues is language itself. 
For instance, consider an individual who has learned the English construction ‘let alone’ 
(Fillmore, Kay, & O’Connor, 1988); that is, a communicative construction marked by a 
comparative ‘let alone’ phrase centred between clause X and clause (fragment) Y; e.g., ‘I could 
barely run 1 mile let alone 4 miles’. Learning the ‘let alone’ construction, as one example of a 
more general phenomenon (Section 4), entails learning the deontic value of cues (for policies 
that parse spoken or written language). In short, if I hear you utter the phrase ‘X’ and possess 
                                               
7 Technically, expected free energy is combined with deontic value to score the likelihood of a 
particular policy. In the absence of deontic value, the expected free energy will select the most 
apt epistemic and goal directed policy, given beliefs about the current state of the world. 
Conversely, if certain cues render the deontic value of a policy sufficiently high, it will dominate 
policy selection – and emerge as a habit. 
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prior, reliably shared knowledge of the construction ‘X let alone Y’, then I can reliably expect 
you to follow up with ‘let alone Y.’ This example assumes a (generative) model of how 
communicative sensations are caused – in particular, acquisition of the deontic value of linguistic 
policies entailed by the hypothesis that one is witnessing a ‘let alone’ construction. 
 But how do such reliable mappings come to exist in the first place? That is, how do 
communicative constructions ‘build up’ over (neurodevelopmental or evolutionary) time? 
Consider a simple example: continually walking along the same path across a park each day 
wears down the grass along that path (Constant et al., 2018). As the grass wears down and a clear 
path forms, one learns to expect the associated sensory cues when revisiting the path. Because of 
this, the path becomes increasingly salient for both oneself and for others ‘like me’, who can 
(like me) leverage such ‘meaningful’ traces left by my actions at later time points. Consequently, 
the cognitive processing associated with answering the question ‘Where ought I to walk next’ is 
afforded directly by physical features of the niche. This saves on the costs associated with 
planning as active inference (Attias, 2003; Baker and Tenenbaum, 2014; Botvinick and 
Toussaint, 2012; Mirza et al., 2016) – the inference is literally ‘offloaded’ into the environment 
(see equations in Figs. 2 and 3). The niche provides a clue as to what to do, reliably, as a deontic 
cue. 
Crucially, when this process of ‘carving out’ deontic cues in the niche is performed by an 
increasing number of agents, the deontic value of policies and associated cues becomes 
increasingly robust to perturbations. In other words, the expectations of the social niche – here, 
the set of form-meaning pairings constituting a communicative system – become increasingly 
precise with increases in the number of interactions between agents constituting that system 
(Constant et al., 2019). Increasingly precise, niche-based expectations mean that agents become 
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more likely to sensitise their behaviour to that cue; e.g., the dynamics of a cue become 
sufficiently precise so as to enable learning of that cue and its associated action policy in 
ontogeny (see Section 4.3). In multi-agent systems equipped with an adaptive prior to align 
mental states, learning of deontic value (i.e., inferring the most common policies undertaken by 
other denizens of the niche) is learning the ‘shared’ value of a policy – the value of a policy for 
people ‘like me’ in our community (Figure 3). 
What might it mean to offload cognition into the environment in the fashion above, for 
agents equipped with an adaptive prior to attune mental states? Individuals effectively outsource 
solutions to the problem of ‘How ought I to talk’ to the niche itself. This has implications for the 
origins of cooperative communicative systems (e.g., Santos, Pacheco, & Skyrms, 2011). The 
traces left by repeatedly aligning mental states – via communication – may enable the niche to 
subsequently afford increasingly precise (shared) expectations about how other agents ‘like me’ 
(should) act so, as to align mental states most effectively. Consequently, the cue (or sequence of 
cues) may come to be preferred by both individuals in an interaction at subsequent instances in 
similar contexts (Lewis, 1969; Schelling, 1960; e.g., Clark & Wilkes-Gibbs, 1986). Formally 
speaking, at later instances of interaction, the expected free energy of historically selected 
policies – leveraged to align mental states – falls; such policies then tend to be selected to 
generate predictable action sequences geared towards the alignment of mental states (Friston & 
Frith, 2015b). 
 
Human Communication as Active Inference 
 
This section provides a discussion of our proposal. The species-typical motivation to 
align mental states with conspecifics is cast as an adaptive prior preference for alignment. This, 
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we suggest, provides the basis for a normative framework for predicting, explaining, and 
modelling the behavioural, psychological, and neural underpinnings of cooperative 
communication. Our discussion in this section telescopes from considerations at the microscale 
(i.e., interaction), to the mesoscale (i.e., ontogeny), and, finally, to the macroscale (i.e., cultural 
evolution). 
 
Dynamics at the timescale of interaction: The individual in context 
 
A central part of the content of the prior for alignment is that the actions of agents (e.g., 
oneself) update the mental states (prior beliefs) of other agents. Because mental states cause 
action (and, hence, observations), gathering reliable evidence for this prior means that agents 
orient to the individual(s) towards whom their action is directed – the sensory consequences of 
one’s action are realised by the actions of others. That is, if one expects to infer others’ mental 
states, the only evidence available is found in the observed consequences of others’ actions 
(Figure 4). Indeed, policies that direct action towards others – so as to disambiguate their mental 
states (e.g., attentional orienting and, later, cooperative pointing) – possess an evolutionarily 
unique (Seyfarth & Cheney, 2003), maturationally constrained salience from early in life 
(Matthews, Behne, Lieven, & Tomasello, 2012; Reddy, 2003). Gathering evidence for these 
expectations manifests in coupled action-perception cycles (Friston, & Frith, 2015a), i.e., 
intentionally co-created loops of action-perception that induce a reliable statistical coupling 
between two coupled agents (reviewed in, e.g., Feldman, 2015; Hasson & Frith, 2016; Hasson, 
Ghazanfar, Galantucci, Garrod, & Keysers, 2012). For expository purposes, we may say that, 
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within the coupled action-perception cycle of human agents, evidence for the self amounts to 
evidence for the other; and evidence for the other is evidence for the self. 
Above, we discussed how mutual expectations of cooperativeness play a crucial role in 
getting cooperative communication off the ground in ontogeny. This just means that the 
(epigenetically and neurodevelopmentally) constrained, precise beliefs about the similarity of 
others and oneself enable nascent individuals to engage in cooperative communication. In 
particular, such couplings are only possible because both agents possess reliable expectations 
that the other agent is sufficiently ‘like me’ (cf. Meltzoff, 2007): we share the same prior beliefs 
to attune hidden dynamics. This provides an initial ‘naive’ confidence in beliefs about how one’s 
action will influence another’s prior beliefs (that, in turn, influence sensory outcomes via their 
actions). Borrowing from the language of social constructivist views of development (e.g., 
Rhodes & Wellman, 2017), our prior is a kind of naive certainty in one’s intuitive theory about 
agential efficacy, with respect to the mental states of others (see also Kelso, 2016). This is to say 
that prior beliefs about the niche, e.g., others’ mental states, bottom out just in their expected free 
energy. Belief-guided action (e.g., collaboration) may thus be constrained by salient policies 
entailed by a prior belief that, psychologically speaking, some hypothesis is in common ground. 
Put simply, to the extent that this hypothesis is sufficiently reliable, it will guide action and 
inference (see Figure 4 and, e.g., Gallagher & Allen, 2018; Yoshida, Dolan, & Friston, 2008). 
Pursuing this line of reasoning further provides a single, formally specified framework to 
subsume distinct proximate motivations for communication. That is, proximate motivations for 
communication (e.g., declarative, expressive, informative, interrogative motives; Begus & 
Southgate, 2012; Tomasello, 2019) surface as particular psychological manifestations of the 
same, species-typical tendency to align prior beliefs. Consider two proximate motivations for 
Submitted manuscript (pre-peer-review, pre-copyedit). 
Frontiers in Psychology – Cultural Psychology. Special Issue: Imagining Culture Science: New Directions and 
Provocations. Please do not cite this version. 
 
 
 
communication noted above; namely, a ‘declarative’ one motivated by the desired alignment of 
attentional states; and an ‘interrogative’ one motivated by a desire to learn about the niche. In the 
former case, individuals exploit their reliably shared beliefs to render the niche sufficiently 
similar to themselves (e.g., ‘By ostensively pointing for that other agent, I expect to effectively 
align our mental states with respect to my intended referent’); and in the latter, individuals 
explore the precise, reliable parts of the niche (here, other agents) to improve their internal model 
of the niche (e.g., ‘What is this thing called?’; reviewed in Harris, 2011; Harris et al., 2017). The 
underlying commonality in both cases is that individuals are effectively generating action-
perception cycles that couple them to others, with the result being the alignment of mental states 
with respect to the niche. 
Moving now to relevance optimisation, we remind the reader that this process involves 
finessing the trade-off between the accuracy (e.g., meaningfulness, expressivity) and complexity 
(e.g., minimum description length, hierarchical depth of the policy) of their communicative 
constructions. Under active inference (see Pezzulo, Donnarumma, & Dindo, 2013), if the prior 
beliefs of two individuals are inferred to be highly divergent on the basis of the evidence each 
provides to the other, and if both expect to minimize this divergence to a sufficient degree, then 
costlier (e.g., hierarchically deeper or more complex) policies should become relatively more 
salient as agents become increasingly dissimilar, as these policies will be necessary to resolve 
uncertainty or disambiguate the mental state of inscrutable others. This is in contrast to two 
individuals who ‘speak the same language’. Here, less information needs to flow within the 
coupled action-perception cycle to attune mental states to a similar degree. In support of this 
view, one study (Kanwal et al., 2017) found that adults optimise the relevance of their 
communicative constructions during collaborative tasks as a function of their common ground, 
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by using shorter words for common objects and longer words for uncommon objects (see also 
Winters et al., 2018). Related work suggests that children’s adjective use (Bannard, Rosner, & 
Matthews, 2017), turn-taking dynamics (Butko & Movellan, 2010; see also Lindsay, Gambi, & 
Rabagliati, 2019), and question asking (Nelson, Divjak, Gudmundsdottir, Martignon, & Meder, 
2014) may be usefully cast as if they were optimising the information content of produced 
communicative constructions with respect to processing and energy concerns (cf. Pea, 1979). 
For a receiver, attention to the communicative stream enables updates to one’s beliefs by 
providing ‘contextual effects’ (Sperber & Wilson, 1987); that is, orienting to a speaker 
influences the precision of hypotheses (about, e.g., the interpretation of an utterance) through 
appropriate selection of ascending sensory information. Specifically, individuals appear to 
explain away incoming sensory data by zeroing in on informative (useful) but parsimonious (i.e., 
efficient) explanations of hidden causes (Goodman & Frank, 2016; see also Gershman, Horvitz, 
& Tenenbaum, 2015). For instance, Frank & Goodman (2014) report that adult and child 
listeners disambiguate ambiguous word meanings by optimising the relevance of a speaker’s 
intended meaning8. In particular, these inferences can be captured as if individuals were 
maximising model evidence for the prior belief that speakers are informative (see also Kao et al., 
2014). This is captured by our formulation of cooperative communication, where inferences 
about mental states can be cast in terms of maximising Bayesian model evidence (i.e., 
minimising variational free energy) for the causes of one’s sensation (e.g., another’s mental 
states; Friston & Frith, 2015a). 
                                               
8 Interestingly, in machine learning, automatic relevance determination is a term used to denote 
model selection based upon variational free energy; namely, the removal of redundant model 
parameters to maximise efficiency or Bayesian model evidence. In turn, this is closely related to 
principles of minimum redundancy and maximum efficiency in perception (Barlow, 1974; 
Linsker, 1990; Wipf & Rao, 2007). 
Submitted manuscript (pre-peer-review, pre-copyedit). 
Frontiers in Psychology – Cultural Psychology. Special Issue: Imagining Culture Science: New Directions and 
Provocations. Please do not cite this version. 
 
 
 
Given an adaptive prior for alignment, one should tend to favour policies expected to 
reliably generate evidence of engagement in a coupled action-perception cycle. That is, such 
ostensive policies – policies expected to generate ostensive cues – are adaptive because they tend 
to generate sensory evidence for the hypothesis that one is engaged in a coupled action-
perception cycle. Ostensive policies indicate to one’s communicative partner that attending to 
one’s action (i.e., to the individual generating ostensive cues) will likely be informative for them. 
Consequently, for a recipient, evidence provided by such cues increases the salience of certain 
policies; e.g., attentional orienting geared towards disambiguating the speaker’s prior beliefs 
(Szufnarowska et al., 2014). As attention optimises the precision of sensory cues, ostension in 
the coupled action-perception cycle plays a crucial (if indirect) role in reliably entraining and 
shaping prior beliefs (Axelsson, Churchley, & Horst, 2012; Butler & Tomasello, 2016; Kovács et 
al., 2017). Since prior beliefs generate action, ostensive cues are thus critical for guiding other 
individuals’ actions and hence one’s (attended) sensory states (e.g., Siposova et al., 2018). 
By the same logic, in response to ostensive cues, a recipient should (ostensively) signal 
their own inferred entrance into a communicative coupling (e.g., uptake signals; Sbisà, 2009); as 
well as, for example, their subjective degree of (and certainty in) the attunement of mental states 
(e.g., backchannel signals; Clark & Brennan, 1991). Indeed, other individuals – inferred to 
possess the same adaptive prior for alignment – preferentially leverage cooperative 
communication in turn; that is, respond to one’s communicative bids (Kishimoto, Shizawa, 
Yasuda, Hinobayashi, & Minami, 2007; Wu & Gros-Louis, 2015). This makes sense in light of 
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the adaptive prior specified here: responding to another’s communicative bids is something in 
the interest of both agents9. 
In summary, this subsection provided an active inference account of the microscale 
features of cooperative communication, from an individual’s perspective, noted in Section 2. We 
have thus outlined some important means by which individuals intentionally align their prior 
beliefs with respect to the dynamics of the niche (Constant et al., 2018), including others’ mental 
states (Friston & Frith, 2015a). Indeed, a foundational facet of our account is that the alignment 
of the mental states of conspecifics manifests in the emergence of a novel scale of social and 
cultural dynamics constituted by synchronised component individuals (Ramstead et al., 2018). 
We turn to this now. 
 
Dynamics at the timescale of interaction: The dyad 
 
The precision of one’s prior beliefs relative to another agent’s, with whom one is 
coupled, has important implications for the degree and direction of attunement within and across 
couplings. In particular, the relative precision of the prior beliefs of each agent constrains the 
characteristic pattern of information flow between them – both at the level of turn taking in 
dialogical exchanges, and at the level of learning useful generative models of others10 (and 
                                               
9 It is useful to note that ostensive policies are salient insofar as they are (but one) intentional 
means for rapidly increasing the precision of (certain kinds) of hypotheses for another agent; 
e.g., that it is likely worthwhile to attend to the individual generating the ostensive cues. The 
account on offer therefore accommodates evidence suggesting that non-ostensive (unintentional) 
but nonetheless attention-grabbing actions, like shivering, may have similar effects on others’ 
attentional orienting as ostensive cues (de Bordes, Cox, Hasselman, & Cillessen, 2013; 
Szufnarowska et al., 2014). 
10 In numerical analyses of coupled communication, turn taking is usually implemented by a 
reciprocal augmentation and attenuation of sensory precision – so that one member of the dyad is 
listening while the other is speaking. Please see Friston & Frith (2015a) more details. A more 
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implicitly, of the self) (Friston & Frith, 2015a; 2015b; Gencaga, Knuth, & Rossow, 2015; e.g., 
Schippers, Roebroeck, Renken, Nanetti, & Keysers, 2010). In terms of learning, this means that 
individuals endowed with relatively imprecise prior beliefs tend more, on average across time, to 
modify their own structure to fit that of their communicative partner(s), relative to individuals 
with relatively precise priors. This is a special case of generalised synchronisation that is 
underwritten by the enslaving principle from cybernetics (Tschacher & Haken, 2007). To attune 
prior beliefs in such ‘asymmetric’ couplings, individuals with imprecise expectations in effect 
increase the precision of their sensory states (i.e., ‘up the gain’ afforded to sensory input; 
Auksztulewicz et al., 2017; Moran et al., 2013). This allows them to better change their own 
prior beliefs as a function of the evidence generated by their own (and others’) action. 
Indeed, such an asymmetry in information flow may capture the dynamics of the coupled 
action-perception cycles characteristic of interactions between human infants and children, and 
adults. Experimental and computational evidence suggests that older individuals possess 
relatively precise prior expectations, relative to those of younger, less experienced individuals 
(Karmali, Whitman, & Lewis, 2018; Wolpe et al., 2016). Thus, younger individuals may ascribe 
greater precision to sensory information (Moran, Symmonds, Dolan, & Friston, 2014). The 
hypothesis here is, then, that repeated couplings between infants and children with adults (and 
more experienced peers) may cause the prior beliefs of inexperienced individuals to converge 
more towards the hidden causes generating sensory consequences (i.e., the mental states of more 
experienced others), rather than the other way around (Friston & Frith, 2015b; e.g., Fotopoulou 
& Tsakiris, 2017). That is, coupled action-perception cycles in such dyads tend to be 
                                               
enduring asymmetry relates to how one can learn from others, as illustrated using simulations of 
birdsong in Friston & Frith (2015b). 
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characterized by an asymmetric entrainment of prior beliefs (for a closely related view, see 
Brownell, 2011). 
What does this mean for the dynamics of (neural) belief updating during interaction? 
Technically, attunement to the niche instantiates the generalised synchronisation of the statistics 
of prior beliefs and the niche (e.g., others’ mental states); such that the structure and dynamics of 
individual brains come to recapitulate the structure and dynamics of the niche in which they are 
embedded11 (Friston, 2012). This is depicted in Figure 5. Synchronisation is a phenomenon that 
occurs in coupled chaotic dynamical systems (Pecora, Carroll, Johnson, Mar, & Heagy, 1997). 
Technically, it means that there is a (diffeomorphic) function relating the dynamics of the state of 
one system to those of the system with which it is coupled (Pecora, Carroll, & Heagy, 1995). For 
instance, modelling results suggest that endowing two coupled hierarchical dynamical systems 
with an expectation to infer the hidden causes generating another’s actions enables a 
bidirectional flow of information that synchronises the statistics of their prior beliefs (Constant et 
al., 2018; Friston & Frith, 2015a). Alignment within and across coupled action-perception cycles 
means that the similarity (technically, the mutual information) of individuals’ expectations 
increases (Friston & Frith, 2015b; Hasson & Frith, 2016). In this scheme, attention functions as a 
kind of coupling parameter, and its allocation is constrained by adaptive priors. Attention 
effectively increases the amount of information transferred from the system with precise priors to 
the system with imprecise priors (i.e., the system increasing the gain of its sensory states). 
                                               
11  Technically, hidden states are characterized by their sufficient statistics. This denotes the 
minimum quantities needed to fully describe a probability distribution (Cover & Thomas, 1991). 
For the Gaussian distributions used in active inference, these are the mean and variance (see 
Buckley, Kim, McGregor, & Seth, 2017). Generalised synchronisation implies that the mutual 
information of (the dynamics of) the states occupied by two (e.g.) chaotic dynamical systems is 
high (Pecora et al., 1995). 
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Indeed, studies in ‘two-person’ or hyperscanning neuroscience (Schilbach et al., 2013) 
have found evidence of the synchronising effects of the usage of cooperative communication 
during, e.g., unidirectional person-to-person monologues (Liu et al., 2017; Pérez et al., 2017; 
Stephens, Silbert, & Hasson, 2010), person-to-group monologues (Schmälzle, Häcker, Honey, & 
Hasson, 2015), bidirectional person-to-person dialogues (Jiang et al., 2012), and even between 
classmates and their teacher during daily school activities (Dikker et al., 2017). Crucially, the 
degree of interbrain synchrony of neural dynamics appears to strongly predict psychological 
phenomena; for instance, the subjective meaningfulness of communication (Stolk et al., 2014), 
the accuracy of recall of the content of communication (Zadbood, Chen, Leong, Norman, & 
Hasson, 2017), and the perceived ‘power’ of political speech (Schmälzle et al., 2015; reviewed in 
Feldman, 2015; Hasson & Frith, 2016; Hasson et al., 2012; Schoot, Hagoort, & Segaert, 2016; 
Stolk, Verhagen, & Toni, 2016). Indeed, the quality and amount of action-perception couplings 
over the course of early development better predicts later language ability (Hirsh-Pasek et al., 
2015) and language-related brain function (Romeo et al., 2018) than more traditional measures, 
such as the number of words heard (Zimmerman et al., 2009). Similarly, synchronous interbrain 
(limbic) dynamics in early infancy (i.e., prior to the onset of cooperative pointing) appears to be 
concomitant with several kinds of positive social experience, such as closeness and social 
bonding12 (Atzil, Hendler, & Feldman, 2014; Atzil et al., 2017). Further evidence suggests a 
positive role for repeatedly experiencing synchronised couplings for broad aspects of infant 
socialization and parenting practices (Feldman, 2015, 2017). 
                                               
12 To be clear, our claim is not that only the usage of communicative constructions can give rise 
to interbrain synchrony (see, e.g., evidence of nonverbal interbrain synchrony and associations 
with feelings of interpersonal closeness, Kinreich, Djalovski, Kraus, Louzoun, & Feldman, 
2017). Communicative constructions are merely a (highly useful) means to gather reliable 
evidence for the adaptive prior specified in the main text. 
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Dynamics at the timescale of ontogeny 
 
 
The dynamics sketched in Section 4.1.2 suggests a kind of Vygotskian scaffolding 
(Vygotsky, 1978) or ‘co-construction’ (Tomasello, 2019) of the dynamics of internal states; 
whereby – via recurrent engagement in loops of coupled action-perception with relatively 
‘entrenched’ aspects of the niche – individuals learn (internalize) the salience of culturally 
anticipated policies used to infer hidden states. That is, by acting in a shared environment that 
contains older, relatively inflexible individuals that perform stereotyped behaviour (characteristic 
of ‘how we do things here’), younger individuals are able to learn the deontic value of policies 
(Ramstead et al., 2016; Veissière et al., 2019). For our purposes, this means that individuals’ 
prior beliefs become more similar across couplings through (bidirectional) processes of 
(asymmetric) enculturation13 (Renzi, Romberg, Bolger, & Newman, 2017; Zimmerman et al., 
2009). That is, recurrent episodes of acutely increased alignment – of the kind typical of coupled 
action-perception cycles – are necessary for the creation and maintenance of species-typical 
states. In short, to gather evidence for an adaptive prior that mental states are aligned, one must 
act to bring about sensory states that are indicative of this belief (Byrge, Sporns, & Smith, 2014; 
Chiel & Beer, 1997). 
                                               
13 For expository purposes we leave undiscussed the ontogenesis of critically important and later-
appearing interactions with peers (e.g., Ashley & Tomasello, 1998; Brownell & Carriger, 1990; 
Brownell, Ramani, & Zerwas, 2006; see Brownell & The Early Social Development Research 
Lab, 2016). Future explorations leveraging this approach should look to integrate data relating to 
peer-peer interactions in ontogenesis (reviewed in Brownell, 2011). Indeed, such phenomena are 
of great interest to the present account given the (possibly) more complex dynamics exhibited by 
the attunement of two systems embodying relatively imprecise expectations about how best to 
minimise uncertainty (e.g., Eckerman, Davis, & Didow, 1989). 
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Within and across interactions, such a dynamics increases the adaptive value of, e.g., 
collaborative foraging strategies by increasing inferred reliability in the hidden states generating 
observations (others’ intentions; Han, Santos, Lenaerts, & Pereira, 2015; Nakamura & Ohtsuki, 
2016). This is because gathering evidence for the prior beliefs of other agents entails predicting 
how their beliefs relate to the niche; i.e., how others’ beliefs relate to one’s own mental states as 
well as non-social affordances. Consequently, gathering reliable evidence for others’ mental 
states entails redirecting attention triadically (jointly). In this way, individuals become more 
reliable models of their interlocutor(s), and hence may leverage their own expectations about 
others’ actions to guide expectations over sensory outcomes, like couplings with environmental 
affordances14 (e.g., Bach, Nicholson, & Hudson, 2014; Gallotti & Frith, 2013; Pezzulo, 2011). 
A useful way to increase the degree of alignment of prior beliefs among individuals is to 
send more information to one’s communicative partner. Holding the inferred common ground 
constant, one of the main ways to convey more information is to allow for hierarchically deeper 
policies (e.g., sequences of sequences) to generate action; that is, roughly, to provide more form 
(i.e., use longer communicative constructions). In effect, more information about mental states is 
thereby made observable. This perspective sheds interesting light on the species-typical 
trajectory from triadic attention (Striano & Stahl, 2005) to more reliably enacted forms of joint 
attention underwritten by reciprocal information flow – and the usage of pointing and gesture 
(Carpenter & Liebal, 2011; Tomasello et al., 2007) – to more complex constructions leveraged to 
                                               
14 From this perspective, it may be interesting for modelling work to investigate the notion of 
joint attention as an emergent property of coupling two hierarchical generative models 
attempting to infer the hidden states of each other (e.g., Friston & Frith, 2015a) while embedded 
in a broader ecological niche (e.g., Williams & Yaeger, 2017). In such a context, does joint 
attention effectively function to minimise a sensory Lagrangian over (jointly anticipated) sensory 
states (Sengupta et al., 2016)? What role does cooperative communication play in maintaining 
such a gauge invariance over the action of shared sensory states? 
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transact with the hidden mental states of others (Aureli & Presaghi, 2010; see Colonnesi, Stams, 
Koster, & Noom, 2010). The human agent appears to build up, nuance, and consolidate its 
(mutually expected) repertoire of action policies that, based on experience, have proven useful 
for adequately attuning with the mental states of conspecifics. That is, through this kind of 
continuous growth and hierarchical differentiation in communicative action policies (Goldin-
Meadow, 2007; Tomasello, 2008), human individuals appear as though they were learning to 
tune themselves to the niche, and the niche to themselves. 
Speaking generally, by repeatedly engaging in coupled action-perception cycles, 
individuals distil and abstract deeper observation-policy mappings (i.e., constructions) from the 
bottom up; that is, on an item-by-item basis (reviewed in Tomasello, 2000). In certain cases, 
individuals may then leverage learned hypotheses (about how best to disambiguate mental states) 
to reliably constrain the hypothesis space for learning and inference about constructions15 
(McClelland et al., 2010; see also Tenenbaum, Kemp, Griffiths, & Goodman, 2011). That is, 
induction at higher layers of the model can serve to bootstrap learning at lower layers. Such 
‘domain-general’ learning processes are illustrated by the model of Perfors, Tenenbaum, & 
Regier (2011). These authors provide a proof of principle account showing that several hours of 
child-directed input is sufficient for the posterior expectations of a hierarchical approximate 
Bayesian (i.e., active inference) learner – leveraging domain-general learning mechanisms – to 
converge towards a single, high level hypothesis about the causes of sensory input (here, a set of 
context-free grammars). That is, this set of context-free grammars had the greatest probability at 
                                               
15 Relatedly, because higher, contextualising layers of a hierarchical model sample a larger space 
of inputs in estimating a smaller number of (more abstract) hypotheses (Tenenbaum et al., 2011), 
agents may, in certain instances, learn contextualising ‘overhypotheses’ faster than learning at 
lower layers of the model (Gershman, 2017). 
Submitted manuscript (pre-peer-review, pre-copyedit). 
Frontiers in Psychology – Cultural Psychology. Special Issue: Imagining Culture Science: New Directions and 
Provocations. Please do not cite this version. 
 
 
 
the end of training. Consequently, this empirical prior functioned as abstract knowledge – it 
constrained expectations about likely hypotheses (in particular, auxiliary fronting) at lower 
layers16 (see also Kemp, Perfors, & Tenenbaum, 2007). 
Indeed, modelling schemes employing active inference provide evidence of their utility 
for modelling attunement to a communicative system (e.g., Friston, Rosch, Parr, Price, & 
Bowman, 2017; Kiebel, Daunizeau, & Friston, 2008; Kiebel, von Kriegstein, Daunizeau, & 
Friston, 2009). For instance, Yildiz, von Kriegstein, & Kiebel (2013) used the active inference 
formalism to model word learning under optimal and noisy conditions and under variations in 
speaker accent. By attending to incoming input (i.e., increasing the precision of sensory signals), 
their model tuned its top-down beliefs to the structure of training data, which comprised 
sequences (of sequences) of spoken phonemes. The authors report that this model outperformed 
other computational learning schemes across a range of conditions, and could be used to explain 
the judgements of adult second language learners. Future modelling work could look to cover 
more ecologically valid instances of attunement to communicative constructions; e.g., as 
motivated by the adaptive prior under consideration. 
As noted, alignment with communicative partners means learning a set of ‘automatic,’ 
experientially robust (deontic) observation-policy mappings; e.g., the expectation (for English 
speakers) that a determiner typically precedes a noun (Meylan, Frank, Roy, & Levy, 2017). 
                                               
16 We urge the reader to take the model of Perfors, Tenenbaum, & Regier (2011) with some 
caution. This is because part of the specification of their model was a set of (sets of) grammars; 
that is, their model came ‘pre-equipped’ with knowledge of various (formal, arbitrary) 
grammatical ‘principles’. Thus, their model had simply to converge on the most probable set of 
grammars (hypothesis) given in its ‘innate’ repertoire. However, there is i) no clear evidence for 
such innately specified (i.e., formal and arbitrary) linguistic principles in humans (Dąbrowska, 
2015); ii) no clear formulation of what may be included in such an innate repertoire (Tomasello, 
2004); and iii) numerous logical problems with the evolution of such innate structure 
(Christiansen & Chater, 2008; cf. e.g., Berwick, Friederici, Chomsky, & Bolhuis, 2013). 
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Indeed, this view fits nicely with usage-based approaches to language acquisition (Lieven, 2016; 
Tomasello, 2003). Proponents of this view suggest that “constructions of all types are 
automatized motor routines and subroutines” that “come out of language use in context and… 
cognitive skills and strategies used in non-linguistic tasks” (Bybee, 2003, both p. 158). On our 
account, human brains effectively combine two kinds of learning architectures to capitalize on 
the opportunities afforded by the coupled action-perception cycle: (i) self-supervised, 
hierarchical (approximate Bayesian) learning – where each layer of the processing hierarchy can 
provide context for the layers below, and where learning mechanisms and processes may be 
flexibly recombined according to the task at hand (Badcock, Friston, & Ramstead, 2019) – via 
the confluence of top-down predictions and bottom-up prediction error (Clark, 2013, 2015); and 
(ii) supervised (social) learning in a cultural niche via repeated, immersive practice in a set of 
patterned, organized (e.g., communicative) routines (Ramstead et al., 2016; Roepstorff, 
Niewöhner, & Beck, 2010).  
On average over time, this means that individuals’ communicative action policies become 
sufficiently similar; that is, not identical, but usable (Kidd, Donnelly, & Christiansen, 2018; 
Tomasello, 2003). This is depicted in Figure 6. For instance, Bannard, Lieven, & Tomasello 
(2009) found that the perplexity (an information theoretic measure that quantifies the fit of a 
distribution to a set of observations) of the (probabilistic) context-free grammar used to capture 
one child’s (Brian’s) utterances at age 2;0 was able to account for approximately 15% of the 
utterances of another child (Annie, also 2;0). Similarly, the grammar imputed to Annie at 2;0 was 
able to explain approximately 36% of the utterances for Brian (2;0). Interestingly, at 3;0 model 
fit in either direction was increased. Thus, the grammar imputed to Brian at 3;0 accounted for 
roughly 59% of Annie’s utterances (3;0), while the grammar imputed to Annie at 3;0 accounted 
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for about 63% of Brian’s utterances (3;0). Though the authors did not compute the significance 
of this change, this trend is precisely that expected by the present account, namely, one towards 
statistically similar, i.e., less idiosyncratic prior beliefs over hidden causes. 
In sum, by repeatedly ‘filtering’ one’s action through others’ mental states, as it were, 
one obtains a useful set of policies for economically disambiguating prior beliefs. In the present 
framework, these correspond to policies with a high deontic value (Constant et al., 2019). In this 
way, one’s set of constructions appears to converge on the set of constructions constituting the 
communicative system(s) that tend to generate one’s sensory samples; i.e., one’s speaker 
community. This is to say that the prior beliefs of individuals converge towards an (exploitable) 
degree of similarity. One thus becomes a sufficiently reliable model of the processes generating 
sensory observations; that is, one learns a flexible, context sensitive set of communicative 
constructions. This ontogenetic process of attraction towards a least collaborative effort system 
of communication (Clark & Brennan, 1991) repeats itself, cyclically, across generations. Indeed, 
the coupled dynamics entailed by this view has critical implications for the historical 
development of least effort communicative systems, to which we now turn. 
 
Dynamics at the timescale of cultural evolution 
 
A prediction of the present account is that communicative systems per se (i.e., the 
dynamics of sets of form-meaning pairings) should appear, on average across time, to minimise 
their variational free energy (Ramstead et al., 2018). But what, exactly, does this mean; and how 
might this claim be investigated empirically? Noted above, for a constant amount of common 
ground, a pointing gesture does not as efficiently or reliably allow an agent to infer the causes of 
their sensations as does a more complex linguistic construction. Therefore, in appearing to 
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minimise their free energy, communicative systems may evolve towards a balance of usability 
and learnability (simplicity) in conjunction with a tendency towards increasingly arbitrary, 
hierarchically deeper (complex) action sequences for its constituent users (Ramstead et al., 
2018); that is, communicative systems may appear to optimise an accuracy-complexity, or 
expressivity-compressibility (Tamariz & Kirby, 2016), trade-off. For instance, Tomasello (2008) 
proposes a “drift to the arbitrary” (p. 219). Here – roughly recapitulating the general ontogenetic 
trajectory – simple gestures like pointing give way to more complex gestures like pantomime and 
to ‘vocal gesturing’ using complex, increasingly abstract and arbitrary communicative 
constructions (see also Fay, Arbib, & Garrod, 2013; Perniss & Vigliocco, 2014; Wilcox, 2004). 
Indeed, supporting this hypothesis is the finding that the dynamics of relevance 
optimisation across recurrent interactions (and generations of speakers) manifests in 
constructions appearing to increase in expressivity, with respect to production and processing 
costs (Tamariz & Kirby, 2016; e.g., Kirby, Tamariz, Cornish, & Smith, 2015; Fay et al., 2010). 
In particular, communicative systems may cluster in a kind of ‘least effort’ subregion of a 
hypothetical ‘design space’ (parameter space) of human communicative systems (i Cancho & 
Solé, 2003; Seoane & Solé, 2018; see Dediu et al., 2013). Thus, relative to earlier generations of 
users of a particular communicative system, individuals in subsequent generations attuning to the 
same system may be advantaged compared to earlier generations with respect to communicative 
constructions that can be used to disambiguate mental states (Angus & Newton, 2015; e.g., by 
coming to distinguish among previously undistinguished actions; Senghas, 2003). That is, 
communicative constructions themselves evolve to ‘fit’ the adaptive priors favoured by evolution 
(Christiansen & Chater, 2008; e.g., Kirby, Dowman, & Griffiths, 2007) and, to some degree, the 
specific demands of the (local) ecological niche (Perfors & Navarro, 2014; see also Youn et al., 
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2016). This means that, over historical time, processes of cumulative cultural evolution (Henrich, 
2015; Richerson & Boyd, 2005) finesse the deontic value of constructions by increasing their 
expressivity with respect to the complexity of using and learning such constructions (for similar 
viewpoints, see Christiansen & Chater, 2016; Cornish, Tamariz, & Kirby, 2009; Dingemanse, 
Blasi, Lupyan, Christiansen, & Monaghan, 2015; Fay et al., 2018; Kirby et al., 2015; Tamariz & 
Kirby, 2016). 
On the present view, cooperative communication emerges as a multiscale, self-organized 
process unfolding in interaction, ontogeny, and cultural evolution (see also de Boer, 2011). In the 
active inference formulation, this partitioning of the timescales characterising a communicative 
system is formalised as between-scale differences in the precision of prior beliefs (as one ascends 
scales; Ramstead et al., 2018). Consequently, the adaptive prior under consideration drives and 
sustains each scale of dynamics, and, circularly, the dynamics at each scale generate actions that 
appear to gather evidence for the adaptive prior (thereby further entrenching its existence). Over 
development, the contextualising dynamics of cultural evolution thus appear as a higher-order 
attractor – itself evolving in time, but sufficiently stable from the perspective of an individual in 
ontogenesis – towards which individuals constituting the cultural ensemble converge via 
recurrent engagement in coupled action-perception cycles unfolding, cyclically, in real-time. By 
gathering evidence for their adaptive priors, low-level dynamics appear to create and maintain, at 
least for some period, the observable coherence of a contextualising scale of (cultural) 
organization (McShea, 2016; Szathmáry, 2015); i.e., a communicative system. 
Temporal partitioning in the dynamics of cooperative communicative systems is the 
result of, e.g., increasing the number of components (Smith et al., 2017) and the connectivity 
between components constituting a communicative system (Reali, Chater, & Christiansen, 2018). 
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This means that linear modifications to inputs to the system are associated with nonlinear 
changes in its dynamics (Beckner et al., 2009; Shuai & Gong, 2014). Nonlinearity is a well-
known property of self-organizing systems (Prigogine & Stengers, 1984) and manifests in 
phenomena like critical slowing (i.e., phase transition; Gandhi, Levin, & Orszag, 1998; i Cancho 
& Solé, 2003), parameter reduction (Riley, Richardson, Shockley, & Ramenzoni, 2011), and 
chaotic dynamics (Sanders, Farmer, & Galla, 2018). A change in the characteristic timescale of 
the dynamics of a cooperative communicative system is exemplified by Smith et al. (2017). 
These authors report experimental and simulation results suggesting that multi-person 
communicative systems exhibit slower regularization (decrease in conditional entropy) of a 
plurality marker across generations relative to communicative systems constituted by a single 
individual (for discussion of disparities of the pace of change across communicative systems, see 
Gray, Greenhill, & Atkinson, 2013). 
As noted, the evolution of a communicative system may be cast as motion through a 
design space of communicative systems (Dediu et al., 2013). Such spaces are effectively 
equivalent to the linguistic morphospace (Gray et al., 2013), or the space of states that may be 
taken on by human communicative systems (e.g., linguistic networks; Seoane and Solé, 2018). 
Motion in design space may be relatively simple; for instance, it has been suggested (Bybee, 
2010) that processes of grammaticalization – where certain lexical markers gradually transition 
to grammatical markers – may be modelled in terms of unidirectional (irreversible) motion 
through a continuous parameter space (see Haspelmath, 1999). In some cases, however, the 
motion may be more complex; for instance, the selection pressures acting on a system’s 
constructions (i.e., the characteristic way in which sets of constructions evolve in time) may vary 
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as a function of the size of the population of speakers constituting the system (Fay & Ellison, 
2013; Lupyan & Dale, 2010; Reali et al., 2018; see Dingemanse et al., 2015). 
On the current account, the cultural niche construction implicit in free energy 
minimisation in an ensemble of communicating conspecifics can be seen as a form of active 
inference on an evolutionary level. In other words, selection pressures are just free energy 
gradients that render natural selection a process of Bayesian model selection to maximise fitness; 
i.e., model evidence or the probability of communicative exchange, under a shared generative 
(phenotypic) model. This perspective nicely combines structure learning, evolution, and niche 
construction within the same formalism. Please see Campbell (2016), Constant et al. (2018), 
Frank (2012), and Sella and Hirsh (2005) for further discussion. 
In sum, communicative systems build up regimes of expectations and beliefs (Constant et 
al., 2019). These regimes are encoded and transmitted in optimised systems of constructions that, 
in effect, inform extant learners of what previous users have found interesting to talk about, and 
how to do so (Gelman & Roberts, 2017; Youn et al., 2016). The motion of cooperative 
communicative systems is, we submit, constrained in two general ways. Firstly, it is constrained 
‘directly’ by the adaptive prior: communicative systems afford a set of tools (constructions) used 
to disambiguate hidden mental states (Tylén, Weed, Wallentin, Roepstorff, & Frith, 2010). This 
manifests itself in convergence towards least collaborative effort systems that navigate the trade-
off between learnability-simplicity with complexity-expressivity. This pertains to a second, 
‘indirect’ constraint given by the adaptive prior (implicit in Sections 4.1 and 4.2): the processes, 
mechanisms, and prior biases implementing alignment – and many of the recurrent contexts and 
pressures within which this unfolds – are similar across cultures. That is, individuals belonging 
to different cultural ensembles communicate about similar kinds of situations (e.g., actors acting 
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on patients) to do similar things (i.e., to get their point across), and use similar processes, 
heuristics, and schemas to do so (Kemmer, 2003; Tomasello, 2008). Consequently, both 
idiosyncrasies and similarities in the typological description of (the dynamics of) communicative 
systems are expected (Evans & Levinson, 2009). 
 
Future Directions and Conclusion 
 
The present essay has outlined a novel, multiscale approach to cooperative 
communication based on the first principles of biological self-organization (Friston, 2012, 2013; 
Sengupta et al., 2016). Unpacking the dynamics of the proposed adaptive prior requires an 
integrative approach to research that encapsulates the various timescales from which this prior 
emerges – ranging from the evolutionary history of earlier humans, to the transmission of 
cultural patterns across generations, through to individual development and two people 
conversing in real-time (for an exciting start in this direction, see Christiansen & Chater, 2016). 
Promising future directions are now noted. 
Our approach may be used to study intentional signalling, collaboration, and neural 
dynamics in two-person cooperative games, like the stag hunt scenario. For instance, Grau-
Moya, Hez, Pezzulo, & Braun (2013) leverage active inference to model adults’ cooperation and 
risk sensitivity with a virtual partner in a repeated stag hunt. Taken with work suggesting that 
online communication strategies may be amenable to a similar variational formulation (Pezzulo 
et al., 2013), this may be a useful avenue for research. Such work may be complemented by 
investigations into the neuronal dynamics associated with cooperative communication implied by 
active inference formulations of neuronal message passing (e.g., Bastos et al., 2012; Parr & 
Friston, 2018). 
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For instance, hierarchically higher layers of cortex, such as anterior cingulate cortex 
(ACC; van den Heuvel & Sporns, 2013) integrate limbic afferents encoding salience with control 
policies issued by motor cortex (Friston et al., 2014; Pezzulo et al., 2018; also, Shenhav, Cohen, 
& Botvinick, 2016). In turn, descending connections from (para)limbic cortex convey signals 
unpacked as sequences (of sequences) of cooperatively motivated actions (Apps, Rushworth, & 
Chang, 2016; Haroush & Williams, 2015; Holroyd & Yeung, 2012; Lavin et al., 2013), such as 
declarative pointing (Brunetti et al., 2014; see also Chambon et al., 2017). Interestingly, these 
neural considerations align with the psychological suggestions of Hare & Tomasello (2005). 
These authors suggest that early human selection pressures favoured limbic dynamics encoding 
an increased tolerance and trust for conspecifics in the context of food. 
Thus, an interesting question for future work may be how might sensory evidence of 
group membership (e.g., Cohen, 2012; Dunham, 2018) modify the salience of communicative 
policies leveraged to disambiguate hidden states during interaction (McClung et al., 2017)? 
Indeed, pursuing such research may be particularly interesting in light of recent findings 
suggesting that individuals’ sense of joint agency (‘plural subjecthood’; Gilbert, 1990) and joint 
commitment (e.g., Bratman, 1992) with a collaborative partner is closely intertwined with their 
certainty in the other’s actions and intentions (Bolt & Loehr, 2017; Han et al., 2015; see also 
Michael, Sebanz, & Knoblich, 2016; Nakamura & Ohtsuki, 2016). In the present context, this 
suggests the question, To what extent might at least certain moral sentiments (such as a sense of 
commitment towards one’s collaborative partner; e.g., Gräfenhain, Behne, Carpenter, & 
Tomasello, 2009) emerge from repeatedly coupling the dynamics of two systems mutually 
motivated to infer the hidden causes of each other’s sensations? For instance, Tomasello (2018) 
suggests that the repeated alignment of perspectives via communicatively-coupled action-
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perception cycles is critical to developing a mature (representational) theory of mind; and a 
capacity to leverage a mature theory of mind has been hypothesized to be critical in the 
development of children’s moral learning and judgement (Rhodes & Wellman, 2017). This is a 
potentially broad area for investigation leveraging our approach, and the active inference 
formulation more generally. 
In summary, the adaptive prior for alignment – characteristically unfolding at the 
(slowest) timescale of natural selection – ‘sets the tone,’ as it were, for species-typical patterns of 
evidence gathering unfolding at faster timescales. The adaptive prior for alignment is, in effect, a 
kind of ‘best guess’ about the state occupied by the system. For a human, processes of action, 
inference, learning, and (cultural) niche construction appear, on average across time, in the 
service of gathering evidence for the thought that ‘I’ am like ‘you,’ ‘you’ are like ‘me,’ and that 
‘we’ exist. 
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Figure 1. 
 
Fig. 1. Summary of key features circumscribing cooperative communication. Certain features, e.g., alignment with a 
communicative system, are discussed in Section 4. This paper associates these phenomena with the corresponding 
scale of dynamics underwritten by the free-energy formulation and, more substantively, the hierarchically 
mechanistic mind (see Fig. 4 in Badcock, Friston, & Ramstead, 2019). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted manuscript (pre-peer-review, pre-copyedit). 
Frontiers in Psychology – Cultural Psychology. Special Issue: Imagining Culture Science: New Directions and 
Provocations. Please do not cite this version. 
 
 
 
Figure 2. 
 
 
 
Fig. 2. Active inference. This figure schematizes active inference. It depicts the coupling of an agent’s internal states 
(i.e., the dynamics of which entail its predictions or beliefs about the niche, μ) to its external states (i.e., the 
dynamics of its niche, η). Middle Panel: The influence of the niche on the agent – that is, the information ‘about’ the 
niche to which the agent has access – is given by the dynamics of the agent’s sensations s. Reciprocally, the 
influence of the agent upon its niche – that is, the information about the agent to which the niche has access – is 
given by the agent’s action a upon the niche. This means that the niche is not directly observable from the 
perspective of an agent’s internal states (and the agent’s internal states are unobservable from the perspective of the 
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niche). Consequently, the dynamics generating an agent’s sensations are hidden variables. Hidden variables must be 
inferred from sensory observations. Thus, to minimize the probability of observing surprising sensory states, the task 
for the agent is to attune the dynamics of internal states to those of the niche; or attune the dynamics of the niche to 
those of internal states. The agent must become an (approximate) model of the hidden causes of its sensation (i.e., to 
be a statistical model of the niche). Variational free energy, F, provides a tractable upper bound on the surprisal or 
surprise (cf. prediction error) associated with a sensation, and is a function of two quantities to which the organism 
has access – its sensation and its predictions. Minimising free energy thus entails attuning one’s beliefs to the niche, 
and attuning the niche to one’s beliefs. Lower Panel: The bottom right details how perception optimises free energy 
by implicitly minimising the (Kullback-Leibler) divergence D between prior beliefs about the state of the niche and 
the posterior beliefs. Minimising D makes the agent a model of the niche (and vice versa), and hence provides an 
upper bound on surprise –ln p(s). Although not shown in this figure, policy selection is based upon expected free 
energy that finesses a trade-off between expected KL divergence (epistemic value) and expected surprisal 
(pragmatic value). In expected free energy, the expected KL divergence becomes an information gain or salience, 
while the expected surprisal becomes expected log evidence or prior preferences about outcomes. Upper panel: 
These expressions define the relationship of the niche to the agent. Note the kind of ‘mirror image’ relationship 
between the equations in the upper panel with the equations in the lower. In short, this relationship is a consequence 
of the mathematics of free energy minimization (see Bruineberg, Rietveld, et al., 2018; Constant et al., 2018) and 
means that, by acting on the niche, the niche effectively ‘sees’ and ‘learns’ about the agent in the same way the 
agent sees and learns their niche; and the niche ‘acts’ on the agent in the same way the agent acts on their niche. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted manuscript (pre-peer-review, pre-copyedit). 
Frontiers in Psychology – Cultural Psychology. Special Issue: Imagining Culture Science: New Directions and 
Provocations. Please do not cite this version. 
 
 
 
Figure 3. 
Fig. 3. Thinking through other minds. This Figure shows the acquisition and production of learned cultural 
behaviours (i.e., context sensitive patterns of action) via inference and learning about other minds (full equations in 
Figure 2). In the context of human communication, this dynamics emerges as the result of repeated couplings 
between the actions and sensations of individual agents equipped with an adaptive prior to reliably infer and align 
with the hidden states of conspecifics. Repeatedly inferring the hidden states of others enables a process of cultural 
niche construction that creates, maintains, and modifies a set of shared epistemic (deontic) resources for 
disambiguating the mental states of conspecifics (i.e., communicative constructions). This turns on the ‘mirror 
image’ relationship between internal and external states noted in Figure 2: here, an agent’s external states are 
constituted in part by the internal states of another agent (and vice versa). Thus, as external states cause sensation, to 
infer the motion of external states (that generate sensation) entails inferring other agents’ hidden states. 
Consequently, the set of communicative constructions making up the cultural niche constitutes an integral 
component of the human niche. Production and observation of reliable form-meaning pairings in turn guides 
‘regimes’ of attention that enable species unique forms of cultural learning (see Ramstead, Veissière, & Kirmayer, 
2016; Veissière et al., 2019). Diachronically, communicative constructions are finessed by a community of agents 
via the inheritance and (intended or unintended) modification of constructions (e.g., in either learning or usage) that, 
in the past, have tended to be sufficiently useful with respect to enabling the reliable inference of hidden states. 
Adapted from Veissière et al. (2019).  
 
Submitted manuscript (pre-peer-review, pre-copyedit). 
Frontiers in Psychology – Cultural Psychology. Special Issue: Imagining Culture Science: New Directions and 
Provocations. Please do not cite this version. 
 
 
 
Figure 4. 
 
Fig. 4. One canonical ‘loop’ of the coupled action-perception cycle. This example is ‘canonical’ in the sense that the 
manifestation of the coupled action-perception cycle in a given instance may vary as a function of context and the 
experience of its constituent members (e.g., an infant’s communicative needs with an adult are different than a pair 
of adults’). With this in mind, for two agents A and B expecting to reliably infer each other’s mental states, the 
beliefs of A (‘my idea’) generate A’s observable actions (‘my behaviour’). The actions of A, in turn, cause the 
(attended) sensory states of B. Attention directed towards agent A by agent B in turn enables the observations 
generated by A to entrain the hidden states of B (‘your version of my idea’). This is just some hypothesis entertained 
by B about the causes of B’s observations (i.e., about the mental states generating A’s actions). To increase or 
maintain the reliability of B’s hypothesis, B must then act on the niche (‘your behaviour’) to test B’s hypothesis 
about hidden causes, as it were (that is, to check for mutual understanding, for instance; e.g., Clark & Wilkes-Gibbs, 
1986). B thereby causes A’s attended observations and, hence, A’s mental states (‘my version of your idea’). This 
looping dynamics continues until both agents infer alignment (Friston & Frith, 2015a). Central here is that A is 
attending to the sensory states generated by B (and vice versa) because the only way to gather evidence for the 
adaptive prior that mental states are aligned is to attend to the sensory effects of one’s actions; and evidence for 
hypotheses about the sensory effects of one’s actions can only be given (in the present context) by the actions of the 
other agent. Working backwards, because the actions of another agent are generated by their mental states; and their 
mental states are entrained by (attended) sensory observations; and their sensory observations are generated by one’s 
own actions; we thus arrive at the claim, given at the start of this section, that “A central part of the content of the 
prior belief prescribing the alignment of mental states among conspecifics is that the actions of agents (e.g., oneself) 
modulate the mental states (prior beliefs) of other agents.” 
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Figure 5. 
 
    
Fig. 5. A simulation of free-energy minimisation of the sort implied by the coupled action-perception cycle. Two 
birds – endowed with prior expectations about the hidden states generating a shared (birdsong) narrative – sing for 2 
s and then listen for a response. The posterior expectations for the first bird are shown in red; and the equivalent 
expectations for the second bird are shown in blue (both as a function of time). The left panel shows chaotic and 
uncoupled dynamics when the birds cannot hear each other (‘singing alone’), while the right panel shows the 
synchrony in hidden states that emerges when the birds exchange sensory signals (‘singing together’). The different 
colours correspond to the three hidden states for each bird. When singing alone, the birds cannot hear each other 
(because they are too far apart). Consequently, the dynamics diverge due to the sensitivity to initial conditions 
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implicit in their (chaotic) generative models. The sonogram heard by the first bird is given in the upper panel. 
Because this bird can only hear itself, the sonogram reflects the predictions about action based upon its (first- and 
second-level) posterior expectations. Compare this to the case when the two birds can hear each other (‘singing 
together’). Here, the posterior expectations encoded by internal states show (identical) synchrony at both the sensory 
and extrasensory levels, as shown in the middle panels (e.g., Pérez, Carreiras, & Duñabeitia, 2017). Note that the 
sonogram is now continuous over the successive 2 s epochs, because the first bird can hear itself and the second 
bird. The ensuing synchronisation manifold (i.e., the part of the joint state space that contains the generalised 
synchronisation) is shown in the lower panels. These plot the second-level expectations in the second bird against 
the equivalent expectations in the first. The synchronisation manifold for identical synchronisation corresponds to 
the (broken) diagonal line. For details, see (Friston & Frith, 2015a). 
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Figure 6. 
 
Fig. 6. A duet for one. This Figure depicts learning and communication via repeated engagement in coupled action-
perception cycles in the context of an adaptive prior to align with conspecifics’ hidden states. (a) Shows changes in 
the posterior expectations of an order parameter of the first bird (blue) and second bird (green) determining the 
chaotic structure of the songs depicted in Figure 5 (by number of reciprocal sensory exchanges). The shaded areas 
correspond to 90% (prior Bayesian) confidence intervals. The broken lines (and intervals) report the results of the 
same simulation, but when the birds could not hear each other. (b) Shows the synchronisation of posterior 
expectations encoded by extrasensory areas for the first (i) and subsequent (ii) exchanges, respectively. This 
synchronisation is shown by plotting a mixture of expectations and their temporal derivatives from the second bird 
against the equivalent expectations of the first bird. This mixture is optimized by assuming a linear mapping 
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between the birds’ hidden states. In this example, the second (green) bird had more precise beliefs about its order 
parameter and, therefore, effectively, ‘taught’ the first bird. Parameter estimation (learning) converges towards the 
same value resulting in (generalised) synchrony between the two birds. For details, see (Friston & Frith, 2015b). 
